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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The state appeals from the district court's post-conviction judgment and 
order granting John Joseph Marr a new trial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case a jury convicted Marr of domestic battery 
on his wife, Marcy, following a trial. State v. Marr, 2013 Unpublished Opinion 
No. 782, Docket No. 39918 (Idaho App., December 9, 2013). At the trial Marcy 
testified that she and Marr got into an argument during which he told her she 
"had to listen and do what he says because [she] was married to him." (#39918 
Trial Tr., p. 66, Ls. 17-18.) Marcy asked Marr if she could leave the house and 
call her daughter and Marr "wouldn't let [her] go" and took her phone. (#39918 
Trial Tr., p. 66, Ls. 18-20, p. 67, L. 19 - p. 68, L. 4.) The argument then 
escalated and Marcy testified Marr "choked" her and Marcy bit Marr so he would 
let her go. (#39918 Trial Tr., p. 69, L. 19 - p. 70, L. 21, p. 78, L. 4 - p. 83, L. 4.) 
Marr released Marcy and told her to "go sit in a chair, he was calling the cops." 
(#39918 Trial Tr., p. 84, Ls. 4-23.) 
One of the responding officers noted "Marcy's bottom lip was extremely 
swollen and she had swelling to her face." (#39918 R., p. 11; see also #39918 
Trial Tr., p. 157, Ls. 9-10.) The officer also "noticed Marcy's eyes had red 
splotchy areas on the white parts of her eyes" and "bruises on her neck and 
chest area as well as her left arm." (#39918 R., p. 11; see also #39918 Trial Tr., 
p. 157, Ls. 8-12; #39918 State's Exhibits 10, 1E, 1J (copies attached to this 
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brief).) The emergency room doctor who saw Marcy diagnosed subconjunctival 
hemorrhages, meaning bleeding into the eyeball beneath the conjunctiva, caused 
by choking, and bruising to the face and neck. (#39918 Trial Tr., p. 39, L. 18 -
p. 51, L. 22; #39918 State's Exhibit 2 (copy attached).) 
Marr testified that Marcy attacked him, hit him in the face, and bit his arm, 
so he physically restrained her. (#39918 Trial Tr., p. 194, L. 3 - p. 195, L. 21.) 
Marr testified that Marcy then asked to go to the bathroom, so he let her go. 
(#39918 Trial Tr., p. 196, Ls. 3-8.) Once in the bathroom, according to Marr, 
Marcy "hurt herself." (#39918 Trial Tr., p. 196, L. 21 - p. 197, L. 1; see also 
#39918 Sentencing Tr., p. 35, Ls. 2-8.) At sentencing Judge Mitchell stated he 
did not "believe one word out of [Marr's] mouth about your victim choking 
herself," and characterized that version of events as "delusional." (#39918 
Sentencing Tr., p. 44, L. 19 - p. 45, L. 15.) 
Marr filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for 
domestic battery. (R., pp. 6-66.) He alleged trial counsel conducted an 
inadequate investigation of the victim's "character trait for violence" and that an 
adequate investigation would have revealed a reputation for violence. (R., pp. 9-
10.) At the hearing the district court took judicial notice of the record and 
transcripts from the underlying criminal case. (Tr., p. 4, L. 16 - p. 6, L. 12.) It 
also heard the testimony of Marr's criminal trial counsel, Sarah Sears (Tr., p. 6, 
L. 18 - p. 50, L. 13), the investigator for the public defenders' office, Mark Durant 
(Tr., p. 50, L. 22 - p. 67, L. 7), State Trooper Donald Moore (Tr., p. 67, L. 14 -
p. 77, L. 18), and Marr (Tr., p. 78, L. 18 - p. 89, L. 19). Marr presented a single 
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exhibit, Petitioner's Exhibit A, a handwritten letter to counsel by Marr. (Tr., p. 4, 
Ls. 22-23; p. 81, L. 24 - p. 83, L. 7.) 
Trooper Moore testified he had been an officer in the Bonner's Ferry 
Police Department from December 2003 through September 2011. (Tr., p. 68, 
Ls. 9-15.) In those eight years Trooper Moore encountered Marcy three times: 
"one time" when she was not impaired and "was easy to deal with" and "two 
times" when she was under the influence and "very belligerent." (Tr., p. 70, L. 16 
- p. 71, L. 4.) He characterized her actions in the encounters where she was 
under the influence as "physically resistant" but not "aggressive." (Tr., p. 70, 
Ls. 6-15.) Based on one remembered conversation with a specific officer and 
other conversations not "specifically" remembered with other officers in the 
Bonner's Ferry Police Department (Tr., p. 71, L. 21 - p. 72, L. 4), Trooper Moore 
ultimately testified Marcy had a reputation for being "difficult." (Tr., p. 77, Ls. 1-
7). 
The district court, Judge John Stegner, concluded that "any reasonable 
attorney" would have discovered and presented Trooper Moore's testimony. 
(R., pp. 84-85.) The court also found prejudice because Marr's claim of self-
defense would have been "bolstered." (R., p. 85.) The district court granted a 
new trial based on this finding of ineffective assistance of counsel and denied all 
other claims. (R., pp. 69-97.) 
The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the entry of judgment. 
(R., pp. 99, 132.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it concluded that failure to discover and 
present evidence of Trooper Moore's opinion that the victim was resistive of 
officers when she was under the influence was ineffective assistance of counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That Failure To Discover And 
Present Evidence Of Trooper Moore's Opinion That The Victim Was Resistive Of 
Officers When She Was Under The Influence Was Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that Marr's trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to find and then present at trial evidence of Trooper Moore's opinion that 
the victim had a reputation for being resistive of officers and difficult when she 
was under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp. 82-85.) Application of the relevant 
legal standards shows the district court to have erred. First, the evidence was 
not admissible at trial, and therefore Marr's claim should have been denied on 
both prongs of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard. Second, even if 
potentially admissible, it was neither deficient performance nor was Marr 
prejudiced when counsel did not find and present this evidence at trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Post conviction proceedings are civil in nature. To prevail, a 
petitioner must establish his grounds for relief by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Upon review of a district judge's denial of a 
petition for post-conviction relief, this Court will not disturb the lower 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. When 
reviewing mixed questions of law and fact, this Court will defer to 
the factual findings of the district judge unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous. However, this Court will exercise free review of 
the application of the relevant law to those facts. 
Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-96, 975 P.2d 782, 783-84 (1999) (citations 
omitted): see also Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921-22, 828 P.2d 1323, 
1326-27 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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C. Counsel Did Not Perform Deficiently And Marr Was Not Prejudiced By 
Trial Counsel's Pre-Trial Investigation 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally 
deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there 
is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 
718 P.2d 283,286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct. App. 1989). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-
guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008). "We 
must assess counsel's conduct by way of an objective review of reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms so as to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight" and must "also make every effort to avoid a post hoc rationalization of 
the attorney's conduct." Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 412, 327 P.3d 372, 
388 (Ct. App. 2013). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 
1999). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the 
6 
evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 
164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007). Application of these standards shows neither 
deficient performance nor prejudice because Trooper Moore's testimony was not 
admissible and because, even if admissible, Marr failed to present evidence that 
counsel's pre-trial investigation was deficient or that he was prejudiced in relation 
to Trooper Moore's testimony. 
1. Trooper Moore's Testimony Was Not Admissible At Trial 
"Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a 
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial 
court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test." State v. 
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 562, 199 P.3d 123, 137 (2008) (internal quotes and 
brackets omitted). This standard applies where the claim is that counsel should 
have presented evidence that is ultimately inadmissible. See Caldwell v. State, 
159 Idaho 233, 240, 358 P.3d 794, 801 (Ct. App. 2015) ("trial counsel could not 
have rendered objectively deficient performance for failing to call a witness 
whose testimony was at least arguably inadmissible under the current 
understanding of the law"). Application of the relevant legal standards to the 
facts of this case shows that Trooper Moore's testimony was not admissible to 
show that Marcy was the initial aggressor. 
Rule 404(a)(2) "states that a defendant may use evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the victim to show that the victim acted in conformity 
therewith." State v. Custodio, 136 Idaho 197, 203, 30 P.3d 975, 981 (Ct. App. 
2001). Such evidence must be presented in the form of opinion, but specific acts 
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are within the scope of cross-examination. I.RE. 405(a). Such evidence "may 
serve to buttress a claim of self-defense and to establish that the victim was the 
first aggressor." State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 41, 966 P.2d 33, 41 (Ct. App. 
1998). The character indicated by the proposed evidence must, however, be 
relevant to the facts of the crime. ~ (evidence of victim's character for violence 
irrelevant because not supported by facts of homicide). Finally, evidence whose 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice is 
also inadmissible. I.RE. 403. 
The trait of character indicated by Trooper Moore's testimony was not 
relevant to the facts of this case. Where self-defense is an issue, evidence the 
alleged victim has a "violent or aggressive nature" is admissible to demonstrate 
either the alleged victim was the initial aggressor or that the amount of force used 
by the defendant was reasonable. State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 584-85, 
990 P.2d 7 42, 750-51 (Ct. App. 1999). Trooper Moore testified that Marcy had a 
reputation for being "difficult," "very belligerent," and "physically resistant," but not 
"aggressive," when confronted by law enforcement while intoxicated. (Tr., p. 70, 
L. 6 - p. 71, L. 4; p. 77, Ls. 1-7). There was no evidence presented that Marcy 
had a reputation for violence, and Trooper Moore specifically denied she had a 
reputation for being aggressive. Marcy's reputation for being "difficult" and 
Trooper Moore's opinion that she had been "very belligerent" and "physically 
resistant" in his two encounters with her when she was under the influence was 
not relevant to proving either that she was the initial aggressor or that Marr 
employed reasonable force. 
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Moreover, Trooper Moore's testimony was limited to his opinion and 
Marcy's reputation for how she interacted with law enforcement. It is mere 
speculation that a person with a reputation for being "difficult," "very belligerent," 
and "physically resistant," but not "aggressive," when confronted by law 
enforcement while intoxicated would be more likely to physically assault a 
spouse during an argument. 
Finally, Marr's trial defense was that Marcy attacked him for saying 
something that made her mad and that she hit him, bit him, and then inflicted her 
own injuries in an effort to frame him. (#39918 Trial Tr., p. 194, L. 3 - p. 197, 
L. 1; Tr., p. 16, Ls. 7-19.) His claim that Marcy's injuries were self-inflicted is not 
at all bolstered by Trooper Moore's testimony. Moreover, any slight probative 
value is outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. Trooper Moore's 
character opinion was not admissible evidence, and therefore Marr's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel fails on both prongs. 
2. Even If Admissible, Counsel Was Not Constitutionally Deficient For 
Not Presenting Trooper Moore's Testimony And Marr Was Not 
Prejudiced 
Even if Trooper Moore's opinion testimony were admissible, it was not 
deficient performance to not discover and present it at trial. "The decision of 
what witnesses to call is an area where we will not second guess counsel without 
evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
563, 199 P.3d 123, 138 (2008) (quotations omitted). Where, as here, the 
question is the adequacy of counsel's pre-trial investigation, the "duty to 
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investigate requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable investigation." 
Stevens, 156 Idaho at 412, 327 P.3d at 388. The court should consider both the 
evidence known to counsel and whether the "known evidence would lead a 
reasonable attorney to investigate further." kl "Decisions 'made after less than 
complete investigation' are still reasonable to the extent 'reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation."' State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 
386,418,348 P.3d 1, 33 (2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
Counsel testified that she looked at the ISTARS entries for Marcy to 
ascertain her criminal history. (Tr., p. 19, L. 19 - p. 21, L. 21.) Counsel also 
discussed Marcy's reputation with Marr, who told her Marcy was an alcoholic and 
aggressive, but did not talk to any other potential witnesses about her character. 
(Tr., p. 23, Ls. 2-20.) Marr presented no evidence, however, why a more 
thorough investigation by counsel should have been undertaken or, if 
undertaken, that it would have led to the discovery of Trooper Moore's testimony. 
Trial counsel testified that, in preparation for the trial, she read the police 
reports (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 12-16), read the affidavit of probable cause (Tr., p. 12, 
Ls. 19-20), and met with Marr repeatedly (Tr., p. 14, L. 18- p. 16, L. 1). She 
looked into Marcy's criminal background, which consisted of misdemeanors 
"related to drinking." (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 19-25; p. 21, Ls. 17-21; see also Tr., p. 55, 
L. 21 - p. 56, L. 22 (investigator Durant testified he "pulled the criminal history").) 
She did not look into the facts underlying Marcy's prior convictions. (Tr., p. 22, 
Ls. 2-5.) She also did not conduct an independent investigation into whether the 
victim had a reputation for violence. (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 2-20.) The reason she did 
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not conduct further investigation was that she did not believe that further 
investigation into the victim's criminal record was likely to produce evidence 
helpful to the defense, in part because the victim's injuries were extensive. 
(Tr., p. 44, Ls. 1-11; see also #39918 State's Exhibits 1D, 1E and 1J (showing 
Marcy's injuries, copies attached to this brief).) 
It is not constitutionally required that defense counsel uncover all 
exculpatory or helpful evidence or investigate every potential source of helpful 
evidence. Stevens, 156 Idaho at 413-14, 327 P.3d at 389-40. Rather, the 
decision to not further investigate is not deficient performance if "'reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation."' Abdullah, 
158 Idaho at 418, 348 P.3d at 33 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). 
Counsel's belief that further investigation was unlikely to produce helpful 
evidence, much less evidence of the opinion of a police officer that the victim was 
"physically resistive" but not "aggressive" when intoxicated, was reasonable, and 
therefore not deficient performance. 
Nor was there any showing of prejudice. Trooper Moore was never 
mentioned in either trial counsel's or the defense investigator's testimony. 
(Tr., p. 6, L. 18 - p. 67, L. 7.) Trooper Moore's name is not mentioned in the 
single exhibit admitted by Petitioner at the evidentiary hearing. (Petitioner's 
Exhibit A.) There was simply no evidence presented as to why a reasonable 
investigation of the victim's record or reputation would or could have led to 
Trooper Moore. 
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Moreover, even if Trooper Moore's evidence could and should have been 
found and presented at trial, there was not a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of the proceeding would have been different had he testified. As set 
forth above, his opinion was that the victim was not aggressive, only "physically 
resistant" to law enforcement. If the jury fully accepted that the victim, acting in 
accordance with her character, was "physically resistant" but not "aggressive" at 
the time in question such would not have reasonably led to the conclusion that 
Marr was defending himself or that his defense was reasonable in light of the 
profound injuries he inflicted (see #39918 State's Exhibits 10, 1E, 1J (copies 
attached)), and it certainly did not bolster Marr's defense that those injuries were 
actually self-inflicted. 
The district court initially reasoned: 
Because [Marcy] Jones's character and reputation for being a 
belligerent, physically resistant, and difficult drunk supports Marr's 
claim that Jones attacked him and that he acted in self-defense, 
Marr has met the first prong of the Strickland test. Any reasonable 
attorney would have presented this evidence to bolster her client's 
claim of self-defense. 
(R., p. 84.) The district court's analysis would be correct only if an attorney had a 
constitutional obligation to find and present all admissible evidence that supports 
the defense. This, however, is not true as a matter of law. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 
at 418, 348 P.3d at 33; Stevens, 156 Idaho at 413-14, 327 P.3d at 389-40. The 
relevant legal question was whether trial counsel reasonably decided to limit her 
pre-trial investigation. Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 418, 348 P.3d at 33. 
In addressing that question, the district court noted that trial counsel 
"testified that despite being aware of Jones's criminal history, which suggested 
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Jones was a nasty drunk, she did not interview a single person about Jones's 
character or reputation for being belligerent while intoxicated." (R., p. 84.) The 
district court did not acknowledge counsel's testimony that the reason she did not 
do so was that she did not believe such an investigation would be helpful to the 
defense. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 1-11.) The district court, applying a Ninth Circuit 
standard, concluded only that because (arguably) relevant evidence was 
ultimately found that was enough to show deficient performance. (R., p. 84 
(citing Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067 (91h Cir. 1999)1).) As noted above, the 
proper question was whether the decision to not investigate further based on the 
victim's criminal record was reasonable, and the mere fact that admissible 
evidence might have been discovered is not enough to show deficient 
performance. 
The district court relied heavily on trial counsel's testimony that "'it wouldn't 
have been hard for me to get it if I had just, um, tried to get it. So I think I should 
have had that piece of information."' (R., p. 84.) However, "it" in this quote is not 
Trooper Moore's opinion evidence (Trooper Moore was never even mentioned in 
her testimony or in direct or cross-examination). (Tr., p. 6, L. 18 - p. 67, L. 7.) 
"It" in this testimony was a police report that was never introduced into evidence. 
1 In Hart a defense witness informed defense counsel she "possessed extensive 
and detailed records that proved the truthfulness of her contention" that she was 
with the defendant at the time of the alleged crime. Hart, 174 F.3d at 1068. The 
Court characterized the corroborating documentation as "remarkable." kl Had 
the documentation offered to defense counsel been presented to the jury "it is 
highly doubtful that a reasonable juror could have voted to convict on those 
charges." kl at 1069. Because this case addressed evidence that defense 
counsel was aware of prior to trial, it does not address the situation in this case, 
which regards the scope of pre-trial investigation. 
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Marr's post-conviction counsel presented trial counsel with documents to 
refresh her memory of the victim's criminal record. (Tr., p. 20, L. 7 - p. 21, L. 6.) 
Trial Counsel testified that included in the documents was a police report that did 
not look familiar, and she would have remembered seeing it because it would 
have been "a big mark in the good column." (Tr., p. 22, Ls. 6-16.) The police 
report, trial counsel testified, would have assisted in cross-examination. 
(Tr., p. 24, Ls. 17-22.) The following colloquy then ensued: 
Q. (By [post-conviction counsel]) So is it fair to say, at the time, 
you didn't make a tactical or strategic decision not to pursue that 
evidence? 
A. I don't-I can't say that I made a tactical decision to not include 
that evidence because I don't think I knew about it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I would also like to say it wouldn't have been hard for me to 
get it if I had just, um, tried to get it. So I think I should have had 
that piece of information. I think that if I did not have it, which I 
don't think I had, ... 
Q. . .. Is it fair to say you-you just missed that? 
A. 1-1-1 think, and again it's been four years, I think I missed that. 
(Tr., p. 24, L. 23 - p. 25, L. 14 (emphasis added).) The record is clear that when 
trial counsel testified it would not have been hard to get "it," she was talking 
about a police report, not Trooper Moore's opinion evidence.2 The police report 
shown to trial counsel was never admitted into evidence, and has no known 
connection to Trooper Moore. The testimony that trial counsel did not discover a 
police report about an unknown incident prepared by an unknown officer is not 
evidence that Trooper Moore's opinion regarding Marcy's character was not 
discovered because of deficient performance. The district court clearly erred 
2 This conclusion is further bolstered by subsequent testimony that the only thing 
counsel believed she missed in her investigation was the police report. 
(Tr., p. 43, Ls. 11-21; p. 44, L. 23 - p. 45, L. 13; p. 47, L. 22 - p. 48, L. 10.) 
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when it concluded that trial counsel's acknowledgement that she could have 
obtained a police report related to Marcy supports a finding that counsel could 
and should have discovered Trooper Moore's opinion testimony that Marcy was 
belligerent with officers when intoxicated. 
Marr presented evidence that trial counsel obtained and reviewed the 
criminal history of the victim, but concluded that further investigation into the facts 
and circumstances underlying that history was unlikely to be fruitful. The only 
evidence presented by Marr that the investigation might have been incomplete 
was counsel's acknowledgement that a police report potentially helpful for cross-
examination of the victim should have been discovered. Marr presented no 
evidence that there is any connection between the police report and Trooper 
Moore. The district court's finding that further investigation of the victim's 
criminal history would have led to Trooper Moore's opinion testimony is clearly 
erroneous, and its legal conclusion that trial counsel's performance was deficient 
for deciding not to further investigate the victim's criminal history is legally 
erroneous. Finally, even if counsel should have discovered Trooper Moore's 
opinion evidence it was not likely to have changed the outcome of the trial 
because evidence that Marcy was "physically resistive" of officers but not 
"aggressive" was, at best, marginally relevant to who started the fight or to 
whether Marcy inflicted her own, extensive injuries. 
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I 
I. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
order and judgment granting post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 4th day of October, 2016. 
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